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the military and political complexities involved in the 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
Defending oneself against potential enemies has always 
been and always will be one of the most important aspects of 
survival. Once a threat has been recognized, failure to 
prepare adequately for that threat invites its worst 
consequences. Th is thesis is concerned with the defensive 
preparation for one of the most widely recognized threats in 
the world--the threat of Soviet domination of Western 
Europe. 
Of course the threat to Western Europe is not limited 
to military invasion. There are many complex factors that 
contribute to the overall danger. Among them are political 
intimidation, economic suffocation and industrial/political 
espionage. H~wever, these threats all originate from the 
military threat. It is the military threat to Western 
Europe that is the most apparent and would have the most 
immediate consequences in the region. The scope of the 
thesis will therefore be limited to the military threat to 
Western Europe. 
The military threat, however, is also very complex. In 
pondering defensive preparation to meet the military threat, 
some of the questions that readily come to mind are: What 
might cause the outbreak of hostilities? If armed conflict 
2 
were to begin, what tactics should be used on the 
battlefield? What role should nuclear, biological or 
chemical weapons play and what naval strategy should be 
used? Since each of these questions could be the subject of 
a separate study, this thesis will focus on conventional 
battlefield strategy. 
Although we live in a time in which strategies using 
nuclear weapons dominate the attention of most defense 
analysts, there is an increasing number of reasons why more 
attention should be paid to conventional defense strategy. 
These include: 
1) the need to improve NATO conventional forces, 
which has been labeled as moral and practical by 
virtually every reputable commission, study or 
authority in recent years; 1 
2) the suspicion that the Soviets have been planning 
for potential nonnuclear (conventional) armed 
conflict in Europe since the early 1970's; 2 
3) the fact that NATO policy makers are now giving 
serious consideration to the possibility of 
1 Robert B. Killebrew, Conventional Defense and Total 
Deterrence: Assessing NATO's Strategic Options (Wilmington, 
Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1986), p. 7. 
2 Graham D. Vernon, Soviet Options for War in Europe: 
Nuclear or Conventional? (Washington, D.C.: National 
Defense University, 1979), pp. 14-15. 
3 
3 
fighting battles similar to those of World War II 
which were entirely conventional in nature; 3 
4) the desire to maintain a conventional strategy so 
as to offer an alternative to the possibility of a 
nuclear stalemate or nuclear holocaust; 
5) the concern that, since the Soviets have achieved 
parity or superiority vis-a-vis the U.S. in 
virtually every category of nuclear weapon, the 
threat to escalate to nuclear weapons as a 
deterrent in armed conflict is much less credible 
today; 4 
6) the recognition that, as public abhorrence for the 
use of nuclear weapons increases, the importance 
of conventional weapon strategy as part of the 
Ibid. 
4 Waldo D. Freeman, NATO Central Re ion Forward Defense: 
Correcting the Strategy Force Mismatch (Washington, D.C.: 
National Defense University, 1981), p. l; Killebrew, op. 
cit., p. 1. 
4 
overall deterrent strategy has also increased 
significantly;S 
7) the belief that the Soviets know that conventional 
superiority would allow them to intimidate Western 
Europe politically;6 and 
8) the expectation that if the Soviets did achieve 
over whelming conventional superiority, war would 
become much more likely since war is most likely 
to occur when one side believes a quick victory is 
possible. 7 
These reasons reveal the importance of writing on 
conventional battlefield strategy. 
The intent of the strategy discussed here, if it is 
perceived by a potential adversary to be effective and 
capable of inflicting unacceptable losses, is to deter that 
adversary from initiating armed conflict. The question that 
remains for defense planners is: What is the most effective 
5 Phillip R. Lindner, "Consideration of a Conventional 
Defense of Central Europe," in Conventional Deterrence: 
Alternatives for European Defen~e, James R. Golden, Asa A. 
Clark, Bruce E. Arlinghaus, eds. (Lexington, Mass.: 
Lexington Books, 1984), p. 109; Vernon, op. cit., pp. 15-16; 
Helmut Schmidt, The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture 
Survival, 20 (Jan.-Feb. 1978), 2-10; see also the annual 
Posture Statements of the secretaries of defense of the 
United States since the early 1960's as noted ·in John J. 
Mearsheimer, conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 213. 
6 Killebrew, op. cit., pp. 1-2. 
7 Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 24. 
5 
strategy for maintaining deterrence and, failing that, what 
is the most effective strategy to ensure victory if 
hostilities commence? The purpose of this thesis is thus to 
identify and examine NATO battlefield strategy so that the 
reader can be in a position to evaluate it. This is 
significant because the lives of every citizen of the free 
world, as well as the lives of others, are affected either 
directly or indirectly by the ability of NATO to defend its 
members. 
Having identified the purpose of this study, it is now 
necessary to outline what will be accomplished by the time 
the thesis is completed. The introductory chapter 
illustrates the organization of the thesis and defines some 
of the pertinent terms to be used. The second chapter 
briefly discusses the history of NATO. This chapter is 
arranged into four main sections. The first of these 
describes the events leading up to the formation of the NATO 
alliance. The second section focuses on the early issue of 
German rearmament and is divided into two subsections: 1) 
the Korean War as a catalyst and the European Defense 
Community, and 2) the formation of the Western European 
Union as an alternative to the European Defense Community. 
The third section in this chapter discusses the French 
withdrawal from the integrated military command structure of 
NATO in the 1960's, the reasons for the withdrawal and the 
6 
effect it had on the overall NATO defensive strategy. The 
final section in this chapter illuminates some of the 
present day features of NATO. Specifics in this section 
will examine the organizational structure of NATO and the 
methods used for resolving political and military conflict. 
The third chapter of the thesis examines NATO 
battlefield strategy. The first section within this chapter 
reviews the history of NATO conventional battlefield 
strategy. The two main NATO battlefield strategies that 
predated today's forward defense strategy are discussed. 
The second section within this chapter explores the current 
strategy. This section has a subsection on NATO battlefield 
tactics, and a subsection on NATO air/ground interdiction. 
The subsection on air/ground interdiction outlines the 
concept of Follow-on Forces Attack and how it relates to the 
overall implementation of Forward Defense. 
The fourth chapter illuminates major factors in Forward 
· Defense. The first section examines factors that complement 
the strategy. There are six subsections in this section. 
They include: 1) terrain (natural barriers), 2) man-made 
barriers, 3) force-to-space ratios, 4) attrition and 
exchange rates, and 5) command style. The second section of 
this chapter examines factors that affect the implementation 
of Forward Defense. The discussion here includes a 
subsection on the scenario of a surprise attack and a 
subsection on the NATO decision on mobilization and 
7 
reinforcement. The final chapter summarizes the work and 
provides some military and political conclusions. 
Before proceeding with the main body of this work, it 
is necessary to define some of the terms that will be used. 
ACE--
AFC ENT--
Allied Command Europe. The ACE 
jurisdiction includes the area from 
the Nor th Cape of Nor way to the 
Mediterranean Sea and from the 
eastern border of Turkey to the 
Atlantic Ocean excluding the United 
Kingdom and Portugal. ACE includes 
five subordinate commands: AFCENT, 
AFNORTH, AFSOUTH, UKAIR, and AMF. 
ACE is one of three major regional 
commands within NATO.a 
Allied Forces of Central Europe. 
The countries that assign forces to 
AFCENT are: Belgium, Canada, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, the United States 
and West Germany. The AFCENT 
8 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook 
(Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1985), p. 37; Gregory 
R. Copley and Clifford M. Weiss, eds., Defense and Foreign 
Affairs Handbook, 1985 ed. (Washington, D.C.: Perth 
corporation-;-1985), p. 83 7. 
AFNORTH--
AFSOUTH--
8 
command is responsible for 
defending the NATO area between the 
Elbe River in northern West Germany 
to the Austrian and Swiss borders. 
AFCENT has two subdivisions: 
NORTHAG and CENTAG and is 
headquartered at Brunssum, 
Netherlands. 9 The thesis is mainly 
concerned with this geographical 
area. 
Allied Forces of Northern Europe. 
The AFNORTH command is responsible 
for defending Norway, Denmark, West 
Germany north of the Elbe River and 
the approaches to the Baltic Sea. 
AFNORTH is headquartered in 
Kolsaas, Norway.lo 
Allied Forces of Southern Europe. 
The AFSOUTH command is responsible 
for defending Italy, Greece and 
Turkey. In addition, the United 
States Sixth Fleet, which falls 
under the AFSOUTH command, is also 
9 
10 
Copley, loc. cit., p. 837. 
Ibid. 
AMF--
Battlefield--
Ibid. 
9 
responsible for defending the 
communications and supply lines in 
the Mediterranean Sea and the Black 
Sea territorial waters of Turkey. 
AFSOUTH is headquartered in 
Bagnoli, Italy .11 
ACE Mobile Force. AMF is a 
relatively small multinational 
force designed for operations 
primarily in the northern and 
southern NATO flanks. The AMF is 
highly mobile and can be deployed 
rapidly in any area of ACE. It is 
headquartered in Sechenheim, West 
Germany. 12 
John Mearsheimer, a renowned 
defense analyst, defined this term 
as an area "on which two large 
armies directly face each other 
and, if war breaks out, directly 
engage each other in a relatively 
11 
12 Ibid.; NATO Handbook, loc. cit. 
CENT AG--
Conventional Weapons--
Deterrence--
10 
large amount of space.1113 In this 
thesis, the term refers to the 
modern battlefield in which armored 
vehicles such as tanks dominate the 
scene. It excludes armed conflict 
in which guerrilla warfare or naval 
and air warfare dominate. Air 
warfare is included as a part of 
the battlefield strategy but does 
not dominate it.14 
Central Army Group. One of two 
subdivisions of AFCENT. 
Any weapon that is not nuclear, 
biological, chemical or space 
based. 
Mearsheimer defines this as 
"persuading an opponent not to 
initiate a specific action because 
the perceived benefits do not 
justify the estimated costs and 
risks. 1115 In this thesis it 
applies to persuading a potential 
13 
14 
15 
Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 15. 
Ibid. 
Ibid., p. 14. 
Doctrine--
NATO--
NO RT HAG--
SACEUR--
11 
adversary not to initiate armed 
conflict with NATO members because 
the costs of doing so would 
outweigh the benefits. 
According to Ted Schroeder, a noted 
military author, doctrine is "a 
series of simple universal 
principles of warfare embodied in a 
set of human beliefs. 111 6 Unlike 
strategy, with which it is often 
confused, doctrine only describes 
behavior, it does not urge people 
how to act.17 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
Northern Army Group. One of two 
subdivisions of AFCENT. 
Supreme Allied Commander of Europe. 
The current SACEUR is General 
Bernard w. Rogers. 18 The SACEUR is 
always an American officer. He 
commands ACE. The commanders-in-
16 Ted Schroeder, "Doctrine and Strategy: The Misunder-
stood Basics," Military Review, 66 (May 1986), p. 13. 
17 Ibid., p. 14. 
18 NATO Handbook, op. cit., p. 9. 
SHAPE--
Strategy--
UKAIR--
Copley, loc. cit. 
Ibid. 
12 
chief of all five ACE sub-commands 
{AFNORTH, AFCENT, AFSOUTH, UKAIR, 
and AMF) report directly to the 
SAC EUR. In addition, the SACEUR 
commands the Allied Tactical Air 
Forces and the integrated NATO 
staff at SHAPE.19 
Supreme Headquarters of the Allied 
Powers of Europe. SHAPE is the 
headquarters of ACE and is located 
at Casteau, Belgium. 2 0 
Strategy as it applies to this 
thesis is the plan of action for 
large scale combat operations. 
According to Schroeder, "strategy 
is a set of interconnected 
statements" about deployment and 
employment of military forces. 21 
The United Kingdom Air Forces. 
UKAIR is always commanded by a 
British Air Officer and is 
19 
20 
21 Schroeder, op. cit., pp. 15-16. 
22 Copley, loc. cit. 
13 
headquartered at High Wycombe, UK. 
Its responsibilities include: long 
and short range air support, 
maritime support, conventional 
attack, reconnaissance, air 
defense, and nuclear strike.22 
14 
CHAPTER TWO 
BRIEF NATO HISTORY 
Events That Led To The Treaty 
Europe was economically, politically, and militarily 
dependent on the United States after World War II. The 
uneasy alliance between the Western allies and the Soviet 
Union had begun to deteriorate only a few months after the 
end of the war. Hostility and suspicion towards the Soviets 
were steadily increasing. The Soviets had begun taking 
advantage of a power vacuum in Europe that had been created 
at the conclusion of the war as a result of the rapidly 
decreasing American presence and the tremendous political 
and economic instability that had developed. Soviet 
military, political and economic pressure on territories it 
had occupied in the final stages of the war spawned 
widespread concern over the looming threat of Soviet 
dominance over all of Europe. 23 
Ironically, one of the first persons to recognize the 
Soviet threat to democratic countries after World War II was 
the ever-optimistic Winston Churchill. Churchill, the 
British Prime Minister during the war, identified the 
23 Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: 
Defense in the 1980' s," Foreign Affairs 61 (1983), 
western 
310. 
15 
impending menace of Soviet military superiority over Europe 
in a telegram to President Truman on May 12, 1945. 
I am profoundly concerned 
situation.... Our armies 
undergo a marked reduction .•.• 
about the European 
[are] likely to 
What will be the position in a year or two when 
the British and American Armies have melted and 
the French have not yet been formed ••• and when 
Rus~ia may.cho~fe to keep 200-300 divisions on 
active service? 
Churchill's fears were realized when the allies began 
to disarm at an alarming rate. On May 7, 1945, the day 
Germany surrendered to the allies, the United States had 
3,100,000 men under arms in Europe. Great Britain had 
1,321,000 and Canada had 299,000. Within one year, the 
American armeq strength in Europe had eroded to 391,000, 
British numbers had declined to 488,000 and the Canadians 
had departed completely. At the same time, the Soviets kept 
their armed forces at full strength (about 4-1/2 million 
men) and maintained their war materiel production at full 
capacity. 25 
Fear and anxiety were also enhanced among democratic 
countries after the Soviets annexed large amounts of 
European territory. These annexations r epr es en ted the 
24 Lord Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949-1954 
(Utrecht, Netherlands: Bosch, 1954), pp.3-4, citing Sir 
Winston Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (n.d: n.p., n.d.) n. 
pag. 
25 Lord Ismay, op. cit., pp. 4 and 7. 
16 
subjugation of nearly 25 million people and 200, 632 square 
miles of land. Whole countries such as Lithuania, Latvia 
and Estonia were annexed in their entirety. The Soviets 
also annexed the Czechoslovakian region of Subcarpathia, 
Romania's Bessarabian region and part of Bukovina, Finland's 
Petsamo district and part of the Karelian isthmus, part of 
East Prussia, and eastern Poland.26 
Another factor contributing to the extreme anxiety of 
western European countries at the time was the total 
dominance that the Soviets were able to establish over all 
of eastern Europe. The Soviets used the continuing presence 
of their massive armed forces to intimidate and coerce the 
governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Eastern 
Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania. This "conquest 
without war" represented the suppression of an additional 87 
million non-Russian people with incomes totaling nearly half 
of the entire national income of the Soviet Union. It also 
meant that approximately 392,439 more square miles of land 
were under Soviet control. 27 
More than fear of a direct military attack, the major 
concern was that economic and political collapse would soon 
make a Soviet military attack unnecessary. 
26 Walter Lacquer, Europe Since Hitler: 
Europe, 2d rev. ed. (Harrisonburg, Virginia: 
and Sons, 1982), p. 22; Ibid., p. 5. 
27 Lord Ismay, loc. cit. 
In the wake of 
The Rebirth of 
R.R. Donnelley 
17 
World War II, widespread economic distress had taken place 
and the Soviets were moving to exploit the situation. By 
penetrating coalition governments in this environment, the 
Soviets were able to gain control over a large part of 
Europe. 28 It became obvious that unless Europe received 
tremendous economic and military aid, it would be 
increasingly susceptible to political collapse and Soviet 
domination. 29 The American economic effort to prevent such 
a collapse was called the European Recovery Program, 
otherwise known as the Marshall Plan. 
The Marshall Plan and the Czech Coup 
The European Recovery Program was launched in a speech 
by Secretary of State and General of the Army, George c. 
Marshall, on June 5, 1947. 30 The Marshall Plan was a four-
year program in which billions of dollars were granted to 
Europe for the purpose of facilitating its economic recovery 
28 Sir Nicholas Henderson, The Birth of NATO {London: 
Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), xi; Michael Howard, loc. 
cit. 
29 Phil Williams, "The United States' Commitment to 
Western Europe: Strategic Ambiguity and Political 
Disintegration," International Affairs 59 {Spring 1983), 
200. 
30 Ismay, op. cit., p. 6. 
18 
from the war.31 It was open to all European countries 
including the Soviet Union and the countries under its 
control. Two countries under Soviet control, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, actually sought aid from the Marshall Plan. 
However, the Soviets forbade all countries under their 
domain from accepting any aid from the Plan. Instead of 
accepting the American offer, they set up the Communist 
Information Bureau (COMINFORM) to organize opposition to the 
Plan. 32 
The Soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan is perceived 
by many observers as the turning point in the American, 
British and French governments' policies toward the Soviet 
Union. The personal reactions of Soviet officials were so 
contemptuous and abusive that Ernest Bevin, the British 
Foreign Secretary, and Georges Bidault, the French Foreign 
Minister, were led to believe that any future cooperation 
with the Soviet Union would be impossible.3 3 Not long after 
this, when the Council of Foreign Ministers (a series of 
meetings of the foreign ministers of the four major victors 
31 Ernst H. Van Der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic 
Partnership (New York: Elsevier, 1966), pp. 18, 107-108, 
166. 
32 William Park, Defending the West: A History of NATO 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1986), p. 5; Sir Nicholas 
Henderson, loc. cit.; NATO Handbook, op. cit., p. 70. 
33 Baron Robert Rothschild, "Belgium and the Longest 
Lasting Alliance," NATO Review, 30 (Feb. 1982), 20. 
19 
of World War II [the United States, Great Britain, France 
and the Soviet Union] that was designed to resolve 
differences on the fate of Germany) 34 broke up for the last 
time in December of 1947, Bevin was moved to say to 
Marshall, 
I am convinced that the Soviet Union will not deal 
with the West on any reasonable terms in the 
foreseeable future and that the salvation of the 
West depends upon the formation of some form of 
union formal or informal in character in Western 
Europe, backed by the United States and the 
Dominions, such a mobilization of moral and 
material forces as will inspire co~~idence and 
energy within, and respect elsewhere. 
This breakdown of the Council of Ministers came to represent 
the end of cooperation between the West and the Soviet 
Union. 36 
Bevin's desire for a union within Western Europe spread 
convincingly among more and more European leaders but some 
were still hesitant. The events of February 25, 1948, 
helped persuade remaining doubters about the need for a 
union. On that date, the Soviet Union instigated a coup 
d'etat in Czechoslovakia. The Communist Party there 
34 Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, "The Pentagon 
Negotiations March 1948: The Launching of the North 
Atlantic Treaty," International Affairs 59 (Summer 1983), 
352. 
35 Theodore c. Achilles, 
Led to Atlantic Alliance: 
1979) I 11. 
36 Ismay, op. cit., p. 5. 
"US Role in Negotiations that 
Part I," NATO Review 27 (Aug. 
20 
overthrew the government and installed a regime that was a 
puppet of the Soviet Union. Soon after the takeover, one of 
Czechoslovakia's most respected figures, Foreign Minister 
Jan Masaryk, jumped--some say was thrown--from a high-story 
building window to his death. 37 The impact of these events 
on world opinion was thunderous. The feeling of the time 
was that if the Soviets would do this once, what would 
prevent them from doing it again? Many felt there was 
little a democracy could do to prevent a duplication of 
those events in lieu of armed military strength.38 
The Brussels Treaty 
The first step in the evolution of the solution to this 
threat came with the signing of the Brussels Treaty on March 
17, 1948. Many people feel that if it were not for the 
signing of the Brussels Treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty 
would never have been created. American policy makers were 
reluctant to entangle the United States into any kind of 
alliance unless the Europeans first indicated their own 
willingness to cooperate among themselves. 39 The Brussels 
37 Josef Korbel, The Communist Subversion of 
Czechoslovakia 193 8-194 8: -The-Fai1ure-ofcoexfStence _____ _ 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 156. 
38 Lord Gladwyn, The Memoirs of Lord Gladw.l!! (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), p. 213. 
39 Rothschild, op. cit., p. 22; NATO Handbook, loc. cit. 
21 
Treaty provided that evidence. It represented the first 
real evidence of West European interest in postwar 
cooperation. 40 
The most significant part of the Brussels Treaty is the 
original Article IV which states: 
If any of the High Contracting Parties should be 
the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other 
High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with 
the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all 
the mi!f tary and other aid and assistance in their 
power. 
To the United States, the treaty represented the five 
signatories' (Great Britain, France, Belgium, The 
Netherlands and Luxembourg) willingness to commit themselves 
to a consortium of collective defense and internal 
stability. 42 President Truman emphasized its importance to 
Congress on the very day the treaty was signed: 
I am confident that the United States will, by 
appropriate means, extend to the free nations the 
support which the situation requires. I am sure 
that the determination of the free countries of 
Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an 
40 Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Toward a New 
Transatlantic Bargain (Washington;- D.c:-:- National-De-fense 
University Press, 1985), p. 3. 
41 Ibid., p. 207; Van der Beugel, op. cit., p. 123. 
Article IV became Article V with the Protocol amendments of 
1954. 
42 Sloan, op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
equal determinatiof.3 on our part to help them to 
protect themselves. 
22 
The stage was set for the United States' response to the 
European overture. 
The Vandenberg Resolution 
Probably the most important step in the process of 
including the United States in an alliance with West 
European countries was the Uni tea states Senate's adopt ion 
of Senate Resolution No. 239 on June 11, 1948. Otherwise 
known as the Vandenberg Resolution, it was named after its 
prinicpal author, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan, 
who was also the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations at the time. The resolution marked a significant 
change in the foreign policy of the United States during 
peacetime. 44 For the first time, the United States Senate 
was recommending that the Administration pursue "regional 
and other collective arrangements for individual and 
collective self defense," and the "association of the United 
States, by constitutional process with such regional and 
other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and 
43 Harry s. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope: 
(New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 279. 
1946-1952 
44 Alan K. Henrikson, "The Creation of the North Atlantic 
Alliance," Naval War College Review 33 (May/June 1980), 16-
17; Ismay, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
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effective self-help and mutual aid." 45 Even though the 
resolution was carefully vague, it paved the way for 
negotiators to form an Atlantic alliance under the 
provisions of the United Nations' Charter. 46 
At this point, negotiations to form an Atlantic 
alliance began in earnest between the Brussels Treaty 
powers, the United States, and Canada. Later, Denmark, 
Iceland, Italy, Nor way, and Portugal were formally invited 
to join the alliance. 4 7 As negotiations on the wording of 
the treaty progressed, it became evident the reasons for 
creating the alliance were diverse. 
Different Motivations 
For the Americans, the alliance was seen as an 
opportunity to enhance their strategic capabilities while 
simultaneously preventing the vast resources of Europe from 
falling under Soviet control. They realized that a strong 
and secure Europe would 1) be a tremendous hedge against 
Soviet expansionism and 2) continue to serve as an important 
market for American goods. 48 Americans also saw aid to 
45 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Facts and 
Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1981), p. 7. 
46 Henrikson, op. cit., p. 17; Ismay, op. cit., p. 9. 
47 Ismay, op. cit., pp. 10-11. 
48 Williams, loc. cit. 
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Europe as only temporary. The U.S. hoped that the aid would 
allow Europe to regain its former strength and stature so 
that eventually Europe would be able to fend for itself with 
an absolute minimum of U.S. help. 49 
The Europeans saw it differently. They viewed the 
alliance not as a temporary solution but as a means to 
ensure American commitment to the region. Europeans were 
particularly interested in securing the "umbrella" of 
American strategic nuclear weapons for protection against 
the soviet military threat. 50 They wanted the alliance more 
as a measure of confidence to offset their own collective 
inability to manage any new crisis more than as protection 
against a military attack. NATO to them was a security 
blanket upon which they could rebuild their shattered 
economies. Europeans felt American presence in particular 
was needed to stabilize the region. 51 
Despite their differences, both Europeans and Americans 
recognized the mutual benefits of forming an alliance and 
did so officially by signing the North Atlantic Treaty on 
April 4, 1949, in Washington, D.c. 52 However, differences 
49 Simon Lunn, Burden-sharing in NATO (London: 
and Kegan Paul, 1983), p. a. 
50 Ibid., p. 9. 
51 Howard, loc. cit.; Lunn, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 
52 NATO Handbook, op. cit., p. 71. 
Routledge 
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still existed between the U.S. and the Europeans. One of 
the most prominent was the question of how West Germany 
would fit into the new alliance. This will be discussed 
under the German Rearmament section. 
German Rearmament 
The Korean War Catalyst and the European Defense Community 
(EDC) 
The outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950 
heightened fears that Western Europe might be the object of 
a Soviet invasion. NATO in general and the U.S. in 
particular realized that conventional forces in Europe were 
inadequate to repel such an attack. President Truman 
decided to deploy a significant number of American troops in 
Europe in September 1950. 53 However, the U.S. had a major 
military commitment in Korea and was still leery of getting 
over-committed in Europe. So, the Americans began to insist 
that Europeans increase their share of the defense burden in 
NATO. The U.S. believed the best way to accomplish this was 
through the rearmament of West Germany. 54 To back up their 
demands, they 1 inked the rearmament of Ger many to the 
continued American economic aid that Europeans still 
53 Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European 
Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 18; Sloan, 
op. cit., pp. 10-11. 
54 George, loc. cit. 
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desperately needed. Secretary of State Dulles also strongly 
hinted that if the Europeans did not contribute more to 
their own defense, the u.s. might withdraw some of its 
troops from Europe.SS 
Many Europeans, especially the French, could not bear 
the thought of a rearmed Germany. The French were 
particularly sensitive not only because of the long history 
they had had as mortal enemies with Germany but also because 
of their common border. The U.S., however, was persistent 
in its demands because it saw a German contribution as 
essential to the defense of Europe against Communist forays 
from the east. 56 
The French responded by proposing the Pleven Plan, 
named after its author, French Prime Minister Ren~ Plevin. 
The Plevin Plan called for a European army to be directed 
under a supranational structure including a European 
minister of defense responsible to a European assembly. The 
European army was to include West German participation but 
without allowing a west German national army.S 7 The Plevin 
S5 Ibid.; U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of 
the United States: Western Europe, Vol. 3 (19SO), p. 498. 
56 George, loc. cit. 
57 Geoffrey Warner, "The United States and the Rearmament 
of Western Germany, 1950-4," International Affairs, 61 
(1985), 281; Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," 
Foreign Policy (Spring, 1984), 70; George, op. cit., pp. 18-
19. 
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Plan also called for all West German troops to be subject to 
the direction of the European army while the other European 
countries would have to commit only a portion of their 
forces. 58 The proposal was widely opposed even in France. 
The U.S. and West Germany encouraged its approval, however, 
and after the NATO ministerial meeting in Lisbon in February 
of 1952, considerable progress had been made towards its 
approvai. 59 Subsequent to a few changes, the plan was 
renamed the European Defense Community (EDC), and was signed 
by Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands, on May 27, 1952. 60 Ratification, though, was 
another story. 
More than a year and a half passed before a single 
country ratified the treaty. It was especially in trouble 
in France. The French were highly suspicious, possibly with 
good reason, that under the EDC as it stood then the U.S. 
and Great Britain would lose interest in keeping their 
troops stationed on the continent. They feared that French 
forces would be left virtually alone to defend against a 
rearmed bigger, stronger Ger man army. 61 Pressure from the 
58 
59 
60 
61 
George, op. cit., p. 18. 
Ibid., p. 19; Sloan, op. cit., p. 16. 
Joffe, loc. cit.; Warner, op. cit., p. 283. 
Sloan, op. cit., pp. 21-22. 
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U.S. to ratify the treaty persisted, but support for it 
continued to erode and it was defeated by the French 
National Assembly by almost 2 to 1 in August of 1954. 62 It 
appeared that until there was some sort of British 
association with the EDC and a commitment by the U.S. to 
keep its troops in Europe, there could be no solution to the 
problem of how to integrate West Germany into the Western 
family. 63 
The Western European Union (WEU) 
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden saw the Brussels 
Treaty as a possible solution to the dilemma facing Europe. 
A conference was called to meet at London to discuss the 
problem of German rearmament; it was later moved to Par is. 
At the conclusion of this conference, an agreement had been 
reached between all concerned parties regarding West German 
sovereignty and rearmament. 64 These London and Paris 
agreements, which were concluded in October of 1954, became 
the basis for the WEU. Under the agreements, the Federal 
Republic of Germany was granted its sovereignty and the 
British, French and U.S. occupation of Germany was ended. 
In exchange West Germany agreed to allow foreign military 
62 
63 
64 
Ibid., pp. 22-25. 
Warner, loc. cit. 
Warner, op. cit., pp. 285-286. 
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forces to be stationed on its territory without reducing 
their size. The Western Union Defense Organization, which 
was created by the Defense Ministers of the Brussels Treaty, 
became the Western European Union while west Germany and 
Italy were invited to join the Brussels Treaty as part of 
the agreements. It was also agreed that West Germany would 
become a member of NATO but its military would be under the 
scrutiny of the WEU. The final part of the agreements 
stated that the U.S. and the United Kingdom would commit 
military troops on the continent of Europe for as long as 
their allies desired. 65 The agreements forming the WEU were 
signed in Paris on October 23, 1954, and were ratified by 
all seven members (Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom) by May 6, 1955, when it went into effect. 66 It 
marked the foundation of the strong European defense that 
exists today. 
The new terms of the WEU provided the French with the 
guarantees that were the stumbling block to previous 
attempts to solve the defense problem. All members of the 
WEU are bound by treaty to automatic military and other aid 
65 s tanley R. Sloan, "European Co-operation and the 
Future of NATO," Survival, 26 (1984), 245; Ismay, op. cit., 
P• 9. 
66 NATO Facts and Figures, op. cit., p. 16. 
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if any member is attacked.6 7 That has allayed fears of a 
resurgent West Germany enough to allow it to become what the 
U.S. insisted on--a key part of the NATO deterrence effort 
for all of Europe. 
The main responsibility of the WEU was originally to 
oversee the German rearmament. In recent years, however, 
that responsibility has steadily eroded to the point now 
where it is almost non~existent. Controls against German 
production of different types of conventional arms have 
gradually been removed. The last restrictions against 
German production of conventional arms were removed in a WEU 
Council meeting in June of 1984. 68 
The French Withdrawal 
The final major event in the evolution of NATO was the 
French withdrawal from the integrated military command. On 
February 21, 1966, French President Charles de Gaulle 
announced at a press conference that all French forces in 
Germany and all French personnel assigned to Allied commands 
would be withdrawn from Allied command on July 1, 1966. 
NATO was also asked to remove its headquarters (SHAPE), and 
all NATO forces and facilities from French territory by 
April 1, 1967. In addition, the French wanted all U.S. and 
67 
68 
Joffe, op. cit., p. 71. 
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Canadian installations on French soil to be closed or their 
commands transferred to France by the same date. De Gaulle 
did, however, make it clear that France was not withdrawing 
from NATO entirely--just from the integrated military 
command. Indeed, he promised that France would continue to 
abide by treaty obligations and continue to participate in 
the political aspects of NAT0.69 
Even though the announcement was greeted with alarm 
from several Allied capitals, the French attitude was known 
for quite some time.70 In the 1950's, France became 
disillusioned with the Alliance, especially with the U.S., 
when the NATO allies expressed their support for the French 
role in Indochina but then refused to provide critical 
military assistance to French forces when they were under 
siege at Dien Bien Phu (now part of northern Vietnam). The 
French became further exasperated when the U.S. did not 
support France in their military struggle in Algeria and 
again when the U.S. actively opposed France and Great 
Britain in the Suez Canal crisis of 1956. From these events 
and others, France came to resent American leadership in the 
Alliance and longed for a much more independent role in 
69 James A. Huston, One for All: NATO Strategy and 
Logistics through the Formative Period (1949-1969) (Newark, 
N.J.: University of Delaware Press, 1984), pp. 143-144; 
Sloan, NATO's Futur:e, op. cit., p. 37. 
70 Huston, op. cit., p. 143. 
32 
global affairs. 71 The decision to end its relationship with 
NATO's integrated military command was a consequence of 
these feelings. 
The Alliance suffered some important political costs as 
a result of the French move. The political balance within 
the Alliance was substantially altered--forcing even more 
dependence on American leadership because of the reduced 
French influence. More significant to this thesis, however, 
the French move also had some detrimental effects on NATO's 
military capabilities--mainly in communication and supply 
lines. The loss of France in the integrated military 
command of NATO meant not only that the allies could no 
longer rely on French troops joining any future battle for 
the defense of Europe, but that allied efforts to bring in 
reinforcements and new supplies would be much more 
vulnerable to enemy attacks since they would be forced to 
use seaports much closer to probable front lines of 
battle. 72 
Fortunately, the Allies were up to the challenge that 
the French withdrawal posed. Instead of allowing themselves 
an emotional outburst when the French announced their 
decision, they all maintained their restraint and went about 
71 
72 
Sloan, NATO's Future, op. cit., pp. 34-35. 
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trying to solve the new problems with efficiency. According 
to Harlan Cleveland, then the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, even 
"President Johnson, whose private references to General de 
Gaulle stretched his considerable talent for colorful 
language, imposed an icy correctness on those who had reason 
to discuss French policy in public.11 73 The Allies succeeded 
in reestablishing all necessary NATO institutions in new 
locations outside of France without much delay. 74 
NATO Today 
The 12 original member countries were: Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Nether lands, Nor way, Portugal, the Uni tea Kingdom, and the 
United States. Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952. West 
Germany joined in 1955 and Spain joined in 1982. 75 NATO's 
16 nations are organized into a framework of political and 
military consultation that meets on a regular basis to 
discuss pertinent issues. It is designed to provide 
security for its members through a two-track approach of 
deterrence and dialogue. Since the alliance is not a 
supranational organization, each member country remains 
73 Harlan Cleveland, NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain 
(Ne w Yo r k : Harper and Ro w , 1 9 7 O ) , p. 1 O 6. 
74 Sloan, NATO's Future, op. cit., p. 37. 
75 NA T 0 H and b 0 0 k , 0 p • c i t • , pp. 71- 9 7 • 
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sovereign with equal status. Therefore, all NATO decisions 
must be reached by a consensus of its members. This makes 
for a cumbersome decision-making process that must allow for 
the different viewpoints of each member. 76 
The forum within NATO for political decision-making and 
consultation is called the North Atlantic Council. The 
Council is NATO's highest authority. The Council meets 
every week at the ambassador level (permanent 
representatives), twice a year at the ministerial level 
(member country foreign ministers) and occasionally at the 
heads of state level. Because of the French withdrawal from 
the defense structure, the Council must meet in another form 
for military decision-making and consultation. This forum 
is called the Defense Planning Committee (DPC}. In defense 
matters, the DPC has the same authority as the Council. The 
ambassador or permanent representative level here also meets 
at least once a week, but membership in this unit is 
composed of representatives from countries who are members 
of NATO's integrated military command. The DPC ministerial 
level also meets twice a year, but the ministers here are 
the defense ministers of each member country. Both the DPC 
76 
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and the Council are chaired by the Secretary General of 
NATO who is currently Lord Carrington of Great Britain. 77 
The foundation of the study has now been completed. 
NATO's history has been discussed and the organization's 
structure examined. At this point, the reader should have a 
good basic understanding of the complexities of NATO. The 
stage is now set to explore the main subject of this study--
NATO conventional defense. 
77 NATO Handbook, op. cit., pp. 7 and 33; NATO Facts and 
Figures, op. cit., p. 56; Thomas J. Kennedy, NATO Politico-
Militari Consultation (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 
University Press, 1984), p. 14. 
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CHAPTER 3 
NATO CONVENTIONAL BATTLEFIELD STRATEGY 
At the time of this writing the historic mini-summit at 
Reykjavik, Iceland, was recently concluded. At that meeting 
between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev of 
the Soviet Union, it was proposed for the first time in the 
history of arms control talks that all nuclear weapons be 
gradually phased out. Although an agreement on that 
proposal has yet to be achieved, the fact that the 
possibility of its realization does exist accentuates the 
importance of conventional defense. 7 8 without nuclear 
weapons NATO defense in general and Central European defense 
in particular will ultimately fall back on conventional, 
chemical or biological weapons. The use of chemical and/or 
biological weapons is a real possibility, but their 
consideration is beyond the scope of this study. 
Currently, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies 
have numerical superiority over the NATO allies in almost 
every category of conventional weaponry. Table 1 on page 37 
shows the striking differences between NATO and Warsaw Pact 
forces. 
78 Secretary George Schultz, U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau 
of Public Affairs, Reykjavik: A Watershed in u.s.-soviet 
Relations, Current Policy No. 883 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1986), 1. 
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Table 1. NATO/WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL BATTLEFIELD FORCES 
IN EUROPE 
Category NAT01 Pact 2 
Ground Forces 
Division Equivalents3 90 133 
Main Battle Tanks 19,600 32,000 
Artillery, Mortar, & Multiple 
Rocket Launchers 14,200 23,000 
Anti-tank Guns and Missile 
Launchers 13,370 18,000 
Anti-aircraft Guns and Missile 
Launchers 6,900 12,800 
Armored Personnel Carriers and 
Infantry Fighting Vehicles 32,850 38,000 
Aircraft 
Armed Helicopters 1,430 1,410 
Land Attack Aircraft 4 2,360 3,2005 
Fighter/Interceptors 900 2,700 
Source: Adapted from Andrew Hamilton, "Redressing the 
Conventional Balance," International Security 10 
(Summer 1985), 114; U.S. Department of Defense, 
Soviet Military Power 1987 (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 1987), pp. 92-93. 
1 U.S. Estimate of 1986 NATO data; excludes France and 
Spain; in place in Europe and rapidly deployable forces. 
2 In place in Europe and rapidly deployable forces. 
3 Warsaw Pact divisions normally consist of fewer 
personnel than many NATO divisions but contain more tanks 
and artillery, thereby obtaining similar combat power. 
4 Includes reconnaissance aircraft. 
5 Excludes Soviet strategic (long-range) intereceptors. 
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Numbers alone however, do not tell the entire story. 
Other factors that contribute to the ability of the U.S. and 
its NATO allies to defend Central Europe with conventional 
weapons include the following: the quality of the weapons, 
the quality of the troops and their training, the morale of 
the troops, the skill of the field commanders and their 
command style, the efficiency of communications, the 
accuracy and quantity of intelligence, and the deployment 
and employment of an effective battlefield strategy (for the 
advantages of the defense see Chapter 4). 
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
examine all of these topics, the discussion of this chapter 
and the remainder of the thesis will center on NATO 
conventional battlefield strategies. The debate over the 
acceptability of the current battlefield strategy is on-
going, but it is felt that the current NATO conventional 
battlefield strategy has some advantages that are commonly 
over looked when examining the NATO defense posture. These 
advantages will be examined in chapter 4 after the following 
discussion on NATO strategy itself. 
Early Strategies 
The evolution of today's NATO battlefield strategy for 
the defense of Central Europe began in the early days of 
NATO when the balance of forces in Europe was significantly 
more in favor of the Warsaw Pact (Pact), the military and 
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political alliance of eastern European countries which is 
dominated by the Soviet Union and opposed to NATO. Phillip 
Karber, a distinguished defense analyst, says that in the 
1950's, NATO had to defend 900 km of front with only 35 
brigades (a brigade is about 2,500-5,000 men), while the 
Soviets and their allies had over three times as many troops 
stationed in or near Central Europe. 79 
With their forces outnumbered three-to-one, NATO was 
forced to adopt a "Fallback" strategy. This strategy used 
the Rhine River in West Germany as the anchor for a prepared 
defense. In the event of an attack by opposing forces, NATO 
troops were to retreat behind the river while conducting a 
series of mobile screening actions to cover the retreat. 
These screening actions together with heavy American bombing 
of the Soviet Union would combine to delay and weaken the 
attack. Using the river as a formidable barrier, the NATO 
forces would regroup on its western bank and halt the enemy 
advance. 80 
NATO's introduction of approximately 7,000 tactical 
nuclear weapons (TNW's) and the buildup of the West German 
79 Phillip A. Karber, "The Strategy: In Defense of 
Forward Defense," Armed Forces Journal International 121 
(May 1984), 28; Copley, op. cit., p. 842; William P. Mako, 
U.S. Ground Forces and the De!ense_£!_Cen!£~l_EU££~ 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 113. 
80 Karber, loc. cit. 
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Army allowed the modification of conventional battlefield 
strategy in the 1960's. The TNW's gave NATO firepower and 
the ability to counter any Pact attempt to concentrate 
conventional forces for a breakthrough in NATO defense 
lines. The new weapons also gave NATO depth by providing 
the ability to extend the delaying zone of battle well into 
Eastern Europe. Nuclear interdiction strikes could now 
target the second echelon of Pact reinforcements, as well as 
lines of communication and air bases. This "Trip Wire" 
strategy called for NATO's conventional forces to act merely 
as a triggering device for the TNW's. In the face of any 
type of aggression, NATO's commanders were authorized to use 
the TNW's to prevent an enemy breakthrough.Bl 
Tod~s Strategy 
German rearmament after World War II made Forward 
Defense both militarily and politically necessary. First, 
the rearmament of West Germany added three full corps to 
NATO forces in Central Europe. This enabled the entire 
front to be covered by NATO forces because the density of 
brigades available for the defense line was doubled by the 
German contribution. The German contribution also reduced 
the Pact's quantitative superiority ratio to a very 
manageable 1.5:1. Second, mindful that any sacrifice of 
81 Ibid.; Park, op. cit., p. 30. 
41 
territory could become permanent, the Ger man people regard 
any such strategy as unacceptable so they insist on a 
forward based strategy. If NATO battlefield strategy had 
continued to call for a rapid fallback to the Rhine .River, 
sacrificing a tremendous amount of German territory in 
exchange for gaining time for reinforcements to arrive, the 
West German's would have had nothing to gain by remaining in 
NATO and contributing forces for the common defense. 82 
The doctrine for today's NATO battlefield strategy 
originated with the official adoption of NATO's Military 
Committee document 14/3 {MC 14/3) in March of 1967. It is 
called Flexible Response and remains in effect today. 
NATO's doctrine of flexible response developed as a result 
of Soviet advances in strategic nuclear weapons and TNW's. 
The Soviet advances that impelled the adoption of NATO's 
defense doctrine also made NATO's "Trip Wire" or "Massive 
Retaliation" strategy invalid. When the Soviet Un ion 
acquired virtually the same nuclear capability as the United 
States, NATO's previous strategy of threatening escalation 
to nuclear weapons lost its credibility because doing so 
would mean mutual destruction since both sides had acquired 
the ability to carry out a second strike with strategic 
82 Karber, op. cit., p. 28; Roger L.L. Facer, 
Conventional Forces and the NATO Strategy of Flexible 
Response: Issues and Approaches (San~a Monica, California: 
Rand Corp., 1985), p. 15; Park, op. cit., p. 177. 
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forces from only one country, but there are five different 
countries with forces assigned to the front. It is believed 
that using forces from five different countries adds to 
deterrence by making it more apparent that any attack 
against NATO territory would be an attack against several 
countries not just one. 88 Figure l shows which countries 
have military responsibility for which corps sectors on 
NATO's central front. The length of these corps sectors 
varies from 35 kilometers for the Belgian corps sector to 
200 kilometers for the II west German corps sector. During 
peacetime, each corps is stationed in barracks at different 
distances from the front. In the event of an imminent 
Warsaw Pact attack, however, each corps will be deployed at 
its battle positions on or very near the central front. The 
objective in the strategy is to defeat any Pact attack right 
at the border.89 The following two subsections describe the 
method that would be employed to achieve the objective. 
Tactics 
Over the years, divergent political and military 
interests among the various NATO countries have contributed 
to the tendency of each national army having a different 
88 
89 
Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 169; Mako, op. cit., p. 33. 
Facer, op. cit., p. 16. 
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Figure 1. NATO's Central Front: Corps Sectors of Military 
Responsibility 
Source: 
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preference for the tactics to be used. In the mid 1970's 
however, the NATO countries that provide forces for the 
defense of Central Europe agreed to use the tactic called 
"Active Defense" to carry out the overall strategy of 
Forward Defense. Active Defense is a combination of 
established battlefield tactics. It has three elements, the 
covering force, the defense in sector, and the 
counterattack. Probably the best source for discussion on 
NATO's battlefield tactics is Karber's article, "The 
Strategy: In Defense of Forward Defense." The following 
passage is based on that article. 9 0 
The first element of Active Defense, the covering 
force, engages the enemy as soon as the border is breached 
by invading forces. The object of the covering force is the 
same as the traditional tactic of "Delay/Screening" (a form 
of antitank guerrilla warfare) which is to harass and ambush 
the leading elements of the invading force. Under Active 
Defense however, the covering force is heavily reinforced 
with mechanized infantry and tank units. The heavier 
concentration of men and armour allows the covering force to 
ensure that no forward units penetrate the main defense line 
at high speed. The intense resistance provided by the 
covering force significantly reduces the rate of advance by 
forcing the invaders to regroup into an assault formation 
90 Karber, op. cit., p. 42 and pp. 45-46. 
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instead of a march column. Reducing the speed of the 
attacking forces provides the main body of the defense with 
critical time to assemble and complete the fortification of 
the chief defensive positions 20 to 30 kilometers behind the 
initial point of engagement. This heavily entrenched 
section allows the covering force to commit itself to more 
intense combat by providing an area behind which the 
covering force can regroup if necessary. Even though the 
covering force does not engage in decisive battles, it has 
enough resources and firepower to inflict heavy damage upon 
an invading force in every likely avenue of attack against 
NATO territory in Central Europe. Figure 2 shows the most 
likely axes of advance in a Pact attack on NATO. In order 
of most danger to NATO, these axes are the Fulda Gap, the 
North German Plain, the Hof Corridor (primary and secondary 
routes) and the Gottingen Corridor. These axes are 
determined by the suitability of the terrain for large 
armored forces and the location of the most desirable 
targets inside NATO territory. 
As the battle continues, the covering force will begin 
to withdraw behind the main body of the defense. This main 
body of defense forms the second element of Active Defense. 
It is called the "Defense-in-Sector" and refers to the 
sectors of military responsibility mentioned earlier. The 
primary object of Defense-in-Sector is similar to the 
Figure 2. Most Likely Routes of a Pact Attack Against NATO 
Source: 
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traditional tactic of "Positional Defense" which is to make 
maximum use of prepared or fortified terrain (mines and 
barriers) and natural obstacles with dense dug-in infantry 
and prepositioned armored forces to stop or greatly inhibit 
the forward momentum of an invading force. Defense-in-
Sector differs from Positional Defense however, in that it 
is designed to be somewhat elastic. Although the tactic 
seeks to provide enough density of forces to channel the 
advance and prevent rapid enemy maneuver through uncovered 
gaps, it also allows a degree of flexibility in the 
defensive line to prevent being overrun by a massed 
echeloned Pact attack. In the face of a concentrated heavy 
attack on a relatively small area (breakthrough attempt) the 
front-line NATO commanders have the authority to let the 
defensive line bend or flex. As the defensive line bends in 
the face of a breakthrough attempt, the area of greatest 
enemy threat is identified and commanders can commit 
tactical reserves to the battle along with battalion task 
forces and uncommitted units from dormant areas of the 
front. Here, the momentum of the attack is greatly slowed 
or stopped. Because of a high degree of attrition and the 
greater amount of territory the advancing force must cover, 
the enemy's density of force is tremendously reduced. Also, 
the bulging defense line has exposed the flanks of the 
invading force and allowed its lead elements to become 
overextended with weakened lines of supply and 
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communication. At this point, the third and final element 
of Active Defense, the counterattack, is initiated. 
The object of the counterattack is most like the 
traditional tactic of "Mobile Defense," which is to take 
advantage of the vulnerable flank areas of an invading force 
by maneuvering to attack those positions eventually 
encircling its forward units and cutting them off from their 
supply and communication lines. Other short-term goals in 
this tactic include slicing deep into the enemy's rear area 
and destroying vital air defense systems, artillery support 
and supply depots. Under Active Defense, the counterattack 
may also take the form of a frontal assault on depleted 
units of the first echelon of a Pact attack with the aim of 
rendering them ineffective or destroying them completely 
before the second Pact echelon arrives. In either case, the 
aim of the counterattack is to regain control of lost 
territory. 
It is important to realize that the three sequences of 
the Active Defense tactic are not set in concrete. They may 
have to be repeated a number of times and in the event one 
or more of the three phases cannot be carried out, 
adjustments can be made on the battlefield. For instance, 
if the Pact attack comes perilously close to achieving a 
breakthrough, instead of preparing for a counterattack, 
tactical reserve units and other less-threatened nearby 
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battalions and cross-attached companies would form a 
covering force while the main body of the defense would 
withdraw 10-20 kilometers and set up a new main defensive 
belt. From there the sequence would start over. 
Air/Ground Interdiction 
An integral part of the overall scheme of NATO 
conventional battlefield strategy is the joint air/ground 
interdiction of invading Pact forces. The name that Supreme 
Headquarters of Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) has given this 
concept is Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA). FOFA is not a 
new concept but it does represent a shift in emphasis for 
NATO conventional battlefield strategy. 91 
There has always been a direct connection between 
ground and air forces on the battlefield. From the 
inception of the forward defense strategy, NATO's air assets 
were relied upon to provide heavy close air support for 
friendly ground forces in an effort to hold off any Pact 
breakthrough attempt. But the last ten years saw a 
tremendous improvement in 1) the ability of Pact air forces 
to conduct offensive air attacks on NATO territory, and 2) 
the effectiveness of air defense units in mobile Pact ground 
91 Bernard w. Rogers, "Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA): 
Myths and Realities," NATO Review 32 (Dec. 1984}, l; Thomas 
A. Cardwell III, "Follow-On Forces Attack: Joint 
Interdiction by Another Name," Military Review 66 (Feb. 
1986), 9. 
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forces. The improvements were so dramatic that airspace 
protection began to draw an increasingly large amount of 
NATO air-force resources. so, on November 9, 1984, the NATO 
DPC approved the integration of FOFA into official NATO 
conventional battlefield strategy. FOFA is an attempt to 
make ground-force interdiction combine with air-force 
interdiction to become more decisive and potent. What made 
FOFA possible was an influx of technological innovation. 
NATO commanders had always sought the same objectives that 
FOFA called for but lacked the technological capability to 
achieve those objectives. Advances in mobile-target 
acquisition systems and the ability to destroy or delay Pact 
second echelon assets with air/ground interdiction well to 
the rear of the point of contact with NATO defense forces, 
have given NATO a significantly improved ability to deny 
success to any Pact breakthrough attempt. 92 
In the words of General Rogers, the NATO SACEUR, FOFA 
is designed to attack "those enemy forces which stretch from 
just behind the troops in contact to as far into the enemy's 
rear as our target acquisition and conventional weapons 
systems will permit." 93 The objective of FOFA is to reduce 
92 Kar be r , op. c i t. , p. 4 6 ; Roger s, op. c i t. , pp. 1 0 3 ; 
Boyd D. Sutton et al., "Deep Attack Concepts and the Defence 
of Central Europe," Survival 26 (March/April 1984), 51. 
93 Roger s , op. c i t. , p. 2. 
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to a controllable level the number of Pact forces coming in 
contact with the NATO main defense body by attacking the 
overall Pact military potential before it can engage the 
defenders. The concept was developed with the knowledge 
that invading Pact forces would be deployed in a series of 
succeeding echelons and operational maneuver groups (OMG's) 
designed to maneuver quickly to exploit any weakness that 
may develop in NATO defense lines. FOFA was also developed 
with the assumption that NATO and Warsaw Pact forces would 
be relatively evenly matched in the first echelon but that 
the NATO defense could hold only if succeeding Pact echelons 
could be kept out of the forward battle until it was most 
advantageous to the NATO defenders. 94 
NATO forces will seek to accomplish the goal of 
disrupting, delaying, or destroying Pact second echelon 
forces and OMG's (follow-on forces) by joint interdiction. 
Joint interdiction is the use of conventional air attacks 
and other conventional long-range weapon systems controlled 
by ground forces to strike targets beyond the immediate 
contact zone of battle. These targets include not~only 
military forces but also their supply depots, supply routes 
including bridges and choke points, the means of 
transporting the supplies, airfields, and command and 
94 
cit. 
Ibid., pp. 1-2; Cardwell, op. cit., p. 6; Sutton, loc. 
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control communication centers. While NATO policy forbids 
land incursions outside of its borders, gaining depth to the 
battlefield by FOFA is fully consistent with the NATO 
battlefield strategy of Forward Defense. Even if FOFA 
succeeds only in slowing down the Pact momentum of combat 
operations and inflicting minor attrition, it is expected to 
have a major impact on the successful defense of NATO 
territory. 95 
95 Rogers, op. Cit• I PP· 5-7; Cardwell, loc. cit.; 
Karber, loc. cit. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FORWARD DEFENSE FACTORS 
Factors Complementing Forward Defense 
Natural Barriers (Terrain) 
One of the most important advantages that a defender 
has against an attacker is familiarity of terrain. This has 
been repeatedly proven in armed conflict from Ancient China 
through W or ld War I I to pre sent - day A f g ha n i s tan. The 
willingness and ability to go where the enemy cannot, or 
thinks you cannot, is a limitless value. Terrain can be 
used to conceal forces or protect them from hostile 
firepower. It can also inhibit the ability of an attacker 
to maneuver, forcing him to channel his forces and thereby 
allowing the defender to concentrate his resources where he 
needs them the most. The terrain along the IGB is 
considered to be the best terrain in Central Europe for 
defending against an attack. 96 
CENTAG. In the CENTAG sectors of Central Europe, the 
terrain is generally very obstacle-ridden, with many major 
96 U.S. Army, Operations: FM 100-5 (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Army, 1982), pp. 3/4-3/5; Karber, op. 
cit., p. 33; John J. Mearsheimer, "Maneuver, Mobile Defense, 
and the NATO Central Front," International Security 6 
(Winter 1981-82), 116; Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the 
Swift: Thoughts on Twenty First Centurl._~~rf~ (London: 
Brassey' s Defense Publishers, 1985), p. 73. 
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natural barriers to armored maneuver. They include 1) the 
Fichtel and Rhon Mountains, 2) the Bavarian, Bohemian and 
Franconian Forests, and 3) the Fulda, Leine, Main, Werra, 
and Weser Rivers. These natural barriers would drastically 
reduce the speed of a Pact advance, thus allowing NATO extra 
ti me to maneuver and reinforce its defenses. Consequently 
there are only a few axes of ingress in the CENTAG area that 
would facilitate the kind of rapid advance that Pact 
offensive strategy calls for. Each of these likely axes of 
attack (see Figure 2) is well defended by NATO forces. 97 
NORTHAG. The NORTHAG area of Central Europe is widely 
thought to be more vulnerable to invasion than CENTAG 
because it is dominated by open terrain ideal for the 
movement of massive armored forces. However, NORTHAG is not 
the achilles heel of NATO that some may think it to be. 
There are two terrain factors that are bases for optimism. 
First, the NORTHAG area covers territory that is less than 
half the size of CENTAG, which means that a greater density 
of defenders can be achieved with fewer forces. Second, the 
NORTHAG area is not obstacle free. Significant natural 
impediments to armored forces in the NORTHAG district 
include 1) the Harz Mountains in the Belgian sector, 2) the 
97 John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win 
Quickly in Europe," In terna t ion al Security 7 (Summer 1982), 
20 and 22; Facer, op. cit., p. 16; "Germany South," The 
Times Atlas of the World, 1985 ed.; Sutton, loc. cit. 
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Luneburger Heath in the German sector, 3) the Elbe River in 
the Dutch sector, and 4) a number of smaller rivers, bogs 
and canals scattered throughout the area.98 
The NATO advantage of using existing natural barriers 
to inhibit a Pact attack would be forfeited if the defensive 
forces were deployed anywhere except as far forward as 
possible. The reason for this is that although there are 
significant numbers of strategically important terrain 
obstacles along the IGB, the value of these obstacles 
noticeably decreases beyond 50 kilometers inside NATO 
territory. Beyond 50 kilometers, the avenues of attack 
become wider and easier to maneuver large numbers of armored 
forces. Pact forces in this type of terrain would find it 
much easier to achieve their military objectives rapidly, 
thus denying NATO the opportunity to reinforce its defenses 
with the vast resources of its North American members. 99 
Man-made Barriers 
Another important factor that complements NATO's 
forward defense strategy is the opportunity to use man-made 
barriers to slow or defeat an attack. Man-made barriers 
have two categories: 1) prepared obstacles and 
98 Mearsheimer, 
24-26. 
"Why the soviets Can't Win," op. cit., pp. 
99 Karber, op. cit., p. 34. 
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fortifications, and 2) built-up areas. Both types can be a 
tremendous hindrance to a Pact invasion force because they 
negate Pact advantages of surprise, initiative and speed. 
Prepared Obstacles and Fortifications. Fortifications 
can add to the defender's effectiveness by concealing and 
protecting supplies and communication centers thereby 
allowing more efficient targeting of the invading forces. 
Obstacles can also increase an attacker's vulnerability to 
the defender's firepower by slowing or stopping his rate of 
advance. The slower the rate of advance, the easier it 
becomes to fire accurately on the at tacker, thus increasing 
his casualties. A study by James F. Digby, a defense 
analyst for the Rand Corporation, showed that an attacker's 
casualties will be increased by 60 percent if the defender 
can reduce the rate of advance to a third of its original 
speed.loo 
Some barriers, obstacles and defensive works can be 
developed in peacetime without inordinate intrusion on 
civilian interests. Others however, are much more obtrusive 
and dangerous and therefore cannot be prepared until the 
outbreak of hostilities becomes imminent. These barriers 
include 1) bridge demolition and 2) mines deployed by ground 
forces or scattered by artillery and aviation units. 101 
100 
101 
Freeman, op. cit., pp. 11-12. 
Ibid., p. 12; U.S. Army, op. cit., p. 3/7. 
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Built-Up Areas. The second type of man-made barriers 
that complement Forward Defense is urban areas. Much of 
Central Europe either is now or is becoming dominated by 
cities. An invading force from Eastern Europe would 
encounter some type of city, town or village an average of 
every six kilometers. Sixty percent of the terrain in 
Central Europe is covered by either dense forests or urban 
areas. 10 2 
Built-up or urban areas offer the defender good 
protection and concealment as well as very good points of 
observation and fields of fire. Famous battles for Tobruk, 
Stalingrad, Hue, and most recently Beirut among others have 
shown that over-running urban areas: 1) consumes a 
disproportionate amount of resources, 2) restricts the 
ability to maneuver, 3) dramatically slows down the momentum 
of an offensive, and 4} takes a tremendous amount of time. 
The Soviets appear to be well aware of the defensive 
advantages of built-up areas since their official policy 
seems to call for bypassing them. Yet, doing so also plays 
into the hands of NATO defenders, because, like other 
obstacles, it would force the invaders to channel their 
102 Freeman, op. cit., 
Bracken, "Urban Sprawl 
(Nov./Dec. 1976} 255. 
p. 14; Karber, loc. cit.; Paul 
and NATO Defense," Survival 18 
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forces into areas that will be well prepared for just such 
an occurrence.103 
Force-to-Space Ratios 
The density of the defense or the ratio of the number 
of forces present to the amount of space available is 
another important factor that complements NATO's Forward 
Defense strategy. On the European central front there is a 
finite amount of space that NATO forces must defend (225 km 
in NORTHAG and 500 km in CENTAG). When the density of 
defenders in that space (force to space ratio) reaches a 
certain amount, it becomes very difficult for an attacker to 
move through that space regardless of his numerical 
superiority. The defender in this situation should be able 
to hold off the attack long enough to bring up 
reinforcements or even initiate counterattacks.104 
When a Pact invasion force advances, it must 
concentrate its forces in axes of attack in order to achieve 
the overwhelming numerical superiority necessary to achieve 
a breakthrough. However, space is a factor here as well. 
The factors discussed above, the terrain and man-made 
barriers, will force the attacker to channel his forces in a 
103 Karber, loc. cit.; U.S. Army, op. cit., p. 3/8; 
Bracken, op. cit., p. 15. 
104 Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win," op. cit., pp. 
27-28; Mako, op. cit., p. 36. 
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limited space. Therefore, the number of forces that NATO 
defenders will be up against at any given time during an 
attack will be only those that the given space allows. The 
remainder of the Pact forces will not be at the actual point 
of attack but in the rear areas as secondary echelons where 
they have a minimal impact on the outcome of the battle. 
This means that the force to space ratio does not include 
the overall balance of forces but only those forces that are 
actually at the point of engagement. 105 
-
Another aspect of force to space ratios that is 
advantageous to Forward Defense is the length of the 
defensive line. The shorter the length of the defense line, 
the greater the density of defenders. By defending forward, 
NATO shortens the defense line and thus creates a greater 
density of defenders with the same number of forces. If 
NATO set up its main body of defense 120 km from the IGB 
instead of within 50 km where it is under the Forward 
Defense strategy, it would require 50% more forces to 
acquire the same density of defenders, because the line of 
defense would be lengthened by a third.106 
105 
106 
Park, op. cit., p. 181; Mearsheimer, op. cit., p. 27. 
Karber, op. cit., pp. 33-34. 
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Attrition and Exchange Rates 
The next two factors that complement NATO defense 
strategy are attrition rates and exchange rates. Attrition 
is the total casualties resulting from engagement in a 
battle. It includes not only personnel losses but also 
material losses. The outcome of a battle is partly 
determined by a belligerent inflicting a higher attrition 
rate on his opponent. In armed conflict, the offense 
usually suffers a higher rate of attrition. In other words, 
the total percent loss of force during combat is usually 
greater for the attacking force. That is one of the reasons 
why both NATO and the Soviets believe that Pact forces must 
outnumber NATO forces by at least 3:1 to be successful. 1 07 
As the battle continues over a period of hours or days, the 
attrition rate would affect the total force ratio on both 
sides. The NATO advantages discussed earlier, and the 
lethality of modern NATO anti-tank weapons, will 
progressively reduce the Pact numerical superiority as the 
battle continues. The question then becomes, what kind of 
107 Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional 
Balance," International Secur i tl, 9 (Winter 1984-85) 56 and 
78-79; Simpkin, op. cit., p. 20; Mearsheimer, "Conventional 
Deterrence," op. cit., p. 34; Killebrew, op. cit., p. 108. 
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attrition rate can Pact forces endure before they are 
rendered incapable of achieving their objectives.108 
Contrary to what some may believe, armored fighting 
divisions do not fight to the finish. In real combat, 
commanders of an attacking force will withdraw their forces 
for recuperation when they have been reduced to 50% or less 
of their original strength. Some relatively recent examples 
of armored warfare indicate that in intense combat similar 
to what can be expected in breakthrough sectors of a Pact 
invasion, a daily attrition rate of 10% has been sustained. 
After suffering a sustained daily attrition rate of 10%, it 
is easy to see how whole Pact divisions would be rendered 
ineffective after only a few days.109 
Attrition rates are closely paralleled by exchange 
rates. Exchange rates are the number of losses incurred by 
a belligerent compared to the number of losses incurred by 
his opponent during the battle. If the defender loses one 
armored vehicle for every two that the attacker loses, the 
exchange rate is 2:1. Many defense analysts today believe 
that NATO should be able to achieve an exchange rate of 2:1. 
108 Michael L. Brown and Thomas J. Leney, "Conventional 
Defense: Technology, Doctrine, and Force Structure," in 
Golden, op. cit. pp. 166-169; Posen, op. cit., pp. 78-79. 
For a discussion on the effectiveness of NATO anti-tank 
weapons see Brown, loc. cit. and John J. Mearsheimer, 
"Precision Guided Munitions and Conventional Deterrence," 
Survival, 20 (March-April 1979}, 68-77. 
109 Posen, op. cit., pp. 55-56 and 60. 
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However, as displayed in table 4.1, there is ample reason to 
conclude that the exchange rate in a NATO/Pact conflict 
could exceed 2:1 in NATO's favor. Both of these two factors 
will complement NATO's defensive strategy by significantly 
reducing the Pact's numerical superiority during the course 
of battle.110 
Command Style 
The final complementary factor to be discussed here is 
the style in which NATO forces are commanded. NATO uses a 
style of mission-oriented orders otherwise known as 
"Auftragstaktik." Mission-oriented orders are characterized 
by very general instructions with an absolute minimum of 
detail. Orders of this type usually include only an 
objective, the reason for the objective, and the general 
area of operation. This type of command style allows for 
the greatest amount of independence and initiative on the 
part of all subordinate commanders. It allows NATO field 
commanders the maximum amount of leeway in interpreting and 
110 Ibid., pp. 56 and 80-81. 
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executing those orders, according to the rapidly changing 
situations and opportunities of the battle.111 
The Warsaw Pact on the other hand, uses a style of 
detail-oriented orders otherwise known as "Befehlstaktik." 
Detail-oriented orders stress constant absolute control from 
the highest down to the lowest level of command. Orders of 
this type include the most minute details with intricate 
planning. This command style demands absolute centralized 
control and coordination of action down· to the smallest unit 
on the battlefield and as such, requires large liaison 
elements as part of the command structure. Soviet division 
commanders for example each have fourteen subordinate 
officers directly under their command. Each of these 
officers also has his own staff, making coordination of 
staff activities very cumbersome.112 
With this type of expanded span-of-control, Pact forces 
will most assuredly have a very difficult time responding to 
rapidly changing battlefield situations especially in the 
face of the kind of surprise major counterattacks that NATO 
tactics call for. Faced with NATO-style counterattacks in 
111 F.W. von Mellenthin and R.H.S. Stolfi with E. Sobik, 
NATO Under Attack: Why the Western Alliance Can Fight 
Outnumbered and Win in Central Europe Without Nuclear 
weapons (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 
1984), p. 133; Killebrew, op. cit., p. 49; U.S. Army, op. 
cit., p. 2/7. 
112 Von Mellenthin, op. cit., pp. 134-135 and 143. 
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World War II, under the same type of command style, Soviet 
forces often panicked and rapidly disintegrated. Under 
intense battle conditions, with disrupted communications and 
massive confusion, the command style most capable of 
reacting to rapidly changing situations will create a 
tremendous advantage on the battlef ield.113 
Factors Affecting Forward Defense Implementation 
Surprise Attack 
A surprise attack could have a devastating effect on 
the implementation of NATO's forward defense strategy. This 
is especially obvious when one considers the fact that 
during peace time, less than 2S% of NATO's active brigades 
are stationed within SO km of their main defensive 
positions. 114 The scattered reconnaissance units stationed 
on the border would be virtually alone in trying to stop the 
first wave of a surprise attack. Invading forces could even 
accept inferiority in numbers and still be militarily 
successful because NATO forces would not be deployed to 
resist the attack.llS 
113 
114 
llS 
Ibid., p. 134; Killebrew, op. cit., p. SO. 
Park, op. cit., p. 184. 
Killebrew, op. cit., p. 91. 
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The most effective results for such an attack would 
probably be achieved by launching the attack from a 
standing-start on a dark stormy holiday evening with no 
advance warning. Some defense analysts believe that the 
Soviets now have that capability. The attacking forces 
would seek to penetrate deeply into NATO's rear by drilling 
and splitting the defenses and their reinforcements before 
they had a chance to take their designated wartime 
positions. As they advanced, these forces would continue to 
cause confusion and disorganization in the NATO ranks by 
capturing or destroying command, control, communication and 
intelligence (C 3I) posts while attacking prime targets such 
as nuclear missile sites, conventional weapons depots, and 
airfields. The tactic would most likely achieve 
considerable military success at least in the early stages 
of battle. However, there are also ample reasons for 
optimism toward NATO's defense against a surprise attack.116 
If a surprise attack becomes the method chosen for 
invading NATO territory, the forward-based Soviet uni ts are 
likely to be the only forces used for the attack. There are 
two reasons for this. First, the most valuable commodity in 
a surprise attack is the element of surprise. The Soviets 
and many western analysts question the ability of East 
116 Von Mellenthin, op. cit., p. 122; Park, op. cit., p. 
183; Killebrew, lac. cit. 
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European members of the Warsaw Pact to maintain that element 
of surprise. With that in mind, the Soviets would be very 
leery of involving other Pact countries in a surprise attack 
for fear that some East European source might aid NATO in 
discovering the impending attack. Second, the larger the 
scale of preparations for an attack, the greater the 
likelihood of being discovered and losing the element of 
surprise. Large-scale preparations for attack would be 
r~latively easy to detect.117 As noted by Richard K. Betts 
in his book, Surprise Attack, there are many indicators that 
could tip off an impending Pact attack: 
117 
--Intensified enemy reconnaissance in the battle 
area. 
--Logistics vectors. How are military infra-
structure and support trails being reoriented? 
Are supplies and fuel being moved forward? Are 
field hospitals being established? 
--Dispersal of nuclear weapons from peacetime 
storage sites. 
--Are troops leaving caserns moving into areas 
different from normal maneuver zones? If being 
deployed to quell internal unrest rather than to 
attack NATO territory, they will probably move 
in all directions, not just toward the border. 
--Positioning of artillery, which is usually 
different if optimized for attack rather than 
defense. 
--Forward movement of air defense units. 
--Repositioning of headquarters and administrative 
staff. 
--Coverage of flanks. 
--Ammunition loading patterns. {One problem is 
that in an exercise, no immediate intelligence 
Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack {Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings, 1982), p. 197; Park, op. cit., p. 182; Von 
Mellenthin, loc. cit. 
is available on whether the troops are loading 
live ammunition or blanks.) 
--Mobilization of the rear and political 
preparation of the civilian population. Are 
factories being converted from two- to three-
shift production? Are other Warsaw Pact 
countries mobilizing? 
--A surge in reconnaissance satellites placed into 
orbit. 
--Movement of additional aircraft to forward 
bases. 
--Grounding of aircraft and cancellation of 
training exercises, for maintenance and 
readiness for coordinated mass operations. 
--Sudden growth in naval deployments. 
--Change in the volume of radio traffic, 
especially in command channels. 
--The appearance of special words in dispatches. 118 
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The above means that in order to maintain the element of 
surprise, the attackers would have to limit the number of 
forces involved and limit the actual preparation for the 
attack. The Soviet forces stationed near the !GB are 
capable of carrying out such an attack particularly since 
they have been organized into an effective and autonomous 
fighting force, but they would have to attack alone and 
without reinforcements. Doing so would mean an unfavorable 
force-ratio for the invaders. In addition, the chances of 
achieving absolute surprise are very remote, so NATO's 
forward defenses will more than likely move to at least the 
minimum level of alert by the time the invasion actually 
begins. 119 
118 Betts, op. cit., pp. 191-192. 
119 Killebrew, op. cit., p. 92; Park, loc. cit.; Betts, op. 
cit., p. 207. 
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Notwithstanding any major errors in judgment on the 
part of NATO commanders, the surprise attack would more than 
likely fail before achieving a significant breakthrough. As 
NATO forces organized themselves, the attacking forces would 
come under tremendous pressure from air and ground 
interdiction. For the reasons explained earlier, the 
Soviets would still be largely unmobilized and unable to 
either replace their forward units or provide 
reinforcements. The entire attack would become vulnerable 
to envelopement from a NATO counterattack. Also, if the 
attack is initiated at nighttime, Soviet close air support 
would have difficulty being effective, and by daylight hours 
the NATO counter-air campaign would be in full operation.120 
The Soviet military is undoubtedly well aware of these 
and other weaknesses in the surprise attack tactic. It 
seems logical to conclude that with all the known weaknesses 
of a standing-start surprise attack, the Soviet Union and 
the other Warsaw Pact countries are very unlikely to try 
it. 121 Surprise attack does, however, have some very 
attractive qualities, and what is more likely to happen is a 
modified version of a surprise attack where Pact countries 
fully mobilize and attempt to get such a head start on NATO 
120 
121 
Killebrew, op. cit., pp. 92-93. 
Ibid., pp. 93-94. 
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that nearly insurmountable advantages will be gained by the 
attackers. The next obvious question then becomes: what 
might lead to a Pact mobilization and, when it occurs, how 
fast can and will NATO react to it? 
Mobilization and Reinforcement 
There are many circumstances that could motivate the 
Soviet Union or the entire group of Pact countries to 
attempt an invasion of NATO territory. Most would not be 
enough by themselves to motivate a Pact invasion. 
Nevertheless, a combination of these circumstances (which is 
not unimaginable), occurring at relatively the same time, 
could make the Soviets feel that the only course of action 
to preserve their disintegrating empire would be to initiate 
a preemptive strike at NATo. 122 According to Richard Betts, 
examples of events or circumstances that could lead to such 
a strike include: 
122 
--A change in personnel in the Soviet oligarchy. 
--The political collapse of NATO and/or the 
economic collapse of Pact countries. 
--A worsening of relations or war with China. 
--A crisis in the Middle East involving both 
American and Soviet forces. 
--Accidental naval engagement between American and 
Soviet fleets. 
--The formation of a formal alliance between 
China, Japan and the U.S. 
--The neutralization of any NATO or Warsaw Pact 
country or group of countries. 
Betts, op. cit., pp. 157-159. 
--Civil war o~ anarchy in any country in East or 
West Europe. 123 
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These preludes to a Pact attack would not happen overnight 
and may develop over a period of weeks or even months. The 
existence of nuclear weapons will continue to deter the use 
of force, but if a Pact conventional attack does occur it 
will most likely be the product of a simultaneous 
combination of crises like those mentioned above. In short, 
a conventional attack on NATO is most likely to have some 
advance warning.124 How fast NATO prepares for the 
impending invasion (mobilizes) will have a major impact on 
NATO's ability to implement Forward Defense. 
The implementation of Forward Defense is also heavily 
dependent on actually acquiring the advance warning of a 
Pact attack. With the recent advances in satellite 
reconnaissance, electronic sensors, and listening posts, 
NATO has vastly improved its ability to detect and track 
Pact mobilization measures. These improvements, however, 
encourage reliance on advance warning and increase the 
vulnerability to deception tactics. In World War II, for 
example, the Germans, knowing their internal communications 
were likely to be monitored by the allies, disguised their 
intent to attack in the Battle of the Bulge by transmitting 
123 Ibid., pp. 159-161. 
124 Ibid., pp. 155 and 158; Killebrew, op. cit., p. 94. 
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c~mmanas to concentrate forces in the area to prepare for 
expected allied attacks across the Ruhr River. 125 
Even with plenty of advance warning, the real danger 
lies in the political decision to mobilize and reinforce. 
All the advance warning possible cannot authorize a 
response. NATO leaders would probably find warning of a 
Pact attack very hard to believe because of the knowledge 
that the dangers for both sides are so tremendous. 
Disbelief or skepticism on the part of NATO decision makers 
need only delay the decision to mobilize and the successful 
implementation of Forward Defense could be seriously 
jeopardized. A prime example of this would be if NATO 
leaders decided to delay mobilization in an effort to allow 
Soviet "doves" extra time to deescalate the situation.126 
For NATO decision makers to initiate mobilization and 
reinforcement, a Soviet or Pact mobilization would probably 
have to be too obvious to ignore. Some NATO leaders would 
undoubtedly fear provoking the Soviets unnecessarily until 
the actual intent of Soviet actions is known. Fortunately, 
however, a military response to a Pact threat is not limited 
to an all-or-nothing mobilization. Each country with forces 
on the IGB is free to mobilize separately and senior NATO 
field commanders have some authority to declare an alert 
125 Betts, op. cit., pp. 192 and 198-199. 
126 Ibid., pp. 157, 197, 199. 
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status for their forces. Nevertheless, beyond military 
vigilance, the lowest level of alert, an upgrade to higher 
stages of alert, must have the approval of the NATO DPC. 
The levels of alert that are necessary for mobilization and 
reinforcement (simple, reinforced and general alert) must 
all be approved by the politicians of the DPC. This means 
that full preparedness for a Pact invasion is immensely 
dependent on the declaration of maximum alert by the NATO 
political leaders.127 
The timing of mobilization and reinforcement is 
absolutely critical. The longer it takes to decide when to 
mobilize in the face of a Pact mobilization, the less time 
NATO forces will have to prepare for the onslaught and the 
more likely that the defense of Central Europe will not 
succeed. A recent study on the subject concluded that it 
would take close to a full week after commencement of 
mobilization for NATO forces to make adequate preparations. 
This is the amount of time that would be necessary to place 
charges on bridges, lay mines, crater roads, erect 
obstacles, cut down trees, and prepare the terrain. The 
time needed for preparations stresses the importance of an 
early decision to mobilize and reinforce. If NATO decision 
makers fail to invoke mobilization and reinforcement orders 
127 Ibid., p. 173; Killebrew, op. cit., pp. 94-95. 
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soon after Pact mobilization begins, a Soviet or Pact attack 
would have many of the advantages of a bolt-from-the-blue 
surprise attack--even if NATO began mobilization before the 
attack. The critical issue is how much of a head start will 
Pact forces have in their own mobilization process. If too 
much time elapses, if NATO members are unable to agree to 
mobilize, or even if some NATO countries mobilize 
immediately and others do not, NATO probably will not be 
able to recover in time to restore force ratios to an 
acceptable number.128 
The successful implementation of mobilization is 
extremely dependent on a complex series of movements of men 
and materiel from the United States to Central Europe. 
Without the benefit of reinforcement from the continental 
United States, it is unlikely that NATO forces will be 
adequate to prevent enemy breakthroughs for more than a 
short period of time. The problem is that although the 
manpower can be raised within a few days, it takes much 
longer to supply the necessary materiel.129 Unless they are 
properly equipped, manpower is virtually useless on today's 
modern battlefield. 
128 
129 
N.J •: 
Betts, op. cit., pp. 173-174. 
Ibid., p. 184; James A. Huston, One for All (Newark, 
Univ. of Delaware Press, 1984), p. 289. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Sml!MARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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The reader should now be in a better position to 
evaluate the NATO conventional battlefield strategy for 
Central Europe. The strategy has been identified and 
examined. In order to reinforce the preceding discussion, 
the following section will summarize the entire study. 
In the first chapter, the purpose of the thesis was 
discussed including the several reasons why conventional 
defense is extremely important. In addition, some of the 
most significant terms used in the study were identified and 
defined. Chapter two discussed the evolution of NATO, 
giving the reader some perspective on its origins and the 
diversity of its members. Chapter two is important because 
it helps the reader conceptualize the political divergence 
that has been apparent in the alliance since its inception. 
Chapter three opened with a recent example of why 
conventional defense is increasing in significance. The 
chapter continued with an examination of the early NATO 
battlefield strategies and the reasons for their demise. 
The second major section of chapter three discussed the main 
subject of this thesis--today's NATO battlefield strategy. 
Forward Defense was considered in terms of its place in 
NATO's doctrine of Flexible Response followed by an 
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extensive elaboration on the methods that will be used to 
carry out the strategy. 
Chapter four was important because it explored the 
factors that make Forward Defense a very viable strategy. 
The first section of the chapter examined geographical, 
physical and combat factors that add to the advantages of 
employing Forward Defense as the strategy for defending 
Central Europe. The final section discussed significant 
factors that could conceivably hinder or impede the 
successful implementation of Forward Defense. 
Militar1 and Political Conclusions 
The central problem for NATO or any alliance for that 
matter is and always has been to find a strategy that is 
both politically acceptable to the allies and yet militarily 
credible to the opponent. Any alliance strategy must meet 
that test. When speaking of the conventional defense of 
Central Europe, the strategy of Forward Defense appears to 
fulfill both requirements for NATO. Nevertheless, a careful 
examination of the facts reveals both strong and weak points 
of NATO's current conventional battlefield strategy. The 
first conclusion that comes to mind concerns the rationale 
for basing the strategy on Forward Defense. 
The West Germans are entirely justified in insisting on 
Forward Defense for the NATO battlefield strategy. Within 
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100 kilometers of the IGB lies: 1) almost a third of West 
Germany's total population, 2) 25 percent of the West German 
industrial capacity (one of the most important in the 
world), and 3) the city of Frankfurt, which is one of the 
most vital NATO communication links and military depots. 1 30 
The German people could hardly be expected to support any 
strategy that would call for giving up that 100 km of 
territory for the sake of gaining some tirne--hoping that 
North American reinforcements will arrive soon. The Germans 
must also realize all too well that any sacrifice of 
territory is likely to become permanent. Since West Germany 
is absolutely essential to the success of the alliance, any 
strategy contrary to West German interests would be 
politically impossible to adopt. In addition, military 
considerations such as the terrain at the IGB, force-to-
space ratios, attrition rates and other factors all combine 
to make NATO's defensive strategy very viable. Therefore, 
one can conclude that the rationale for adopting Forward 
Defense is both militarily and politically justified. 
Although the rationale for Forward Defense is sound, 
the strategy does have some significant weaknesses. These 
include problems with logistics during mobilization and 
reinforcement, and the tremendous dependence the strategy 
130 Mako, op. cit., p. 32. 
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places on prompt political decision-making. Either of these 
weaknesses could be enough to defeat the strategy. 
It is difficult to imagine a successful conventional 
defense of Central Europe without the benefit of 
reinforcements from North America. At the same time, the 
logistics of transporting massive amounts of men and 
materiel across the Atlantic is one of the most difficult 
and complicated tasks that can be undertaken. The 
reinforcement process in war-time conditions would be 
vulnerable to many different hazards ranging from enemy 
naval and air interdiction to civilian sabotage as well as 
simple scheduling foul-ups. Even without enemy interference 
the task would be difficult, especially on a tight time 
schedule. The key to successful defense is the amount of 
time given for the mobilization process before hostilities 
actually commence. The amount of time, however, is also 
subject to a second major weakness--the political decision-
making process. 
The political decision-making process is handicapped by 
the necessity to accommodate the perceptions of 16 different 
countries--a relatively large number for any decision-making 
exercise. Since NATO decisions must emerge from a consensus 
of all its members, and since many of the members would be 
expected to have different perceptions of the best course of 
action to take in the face of an increasingly serious Pact 
threat, it is reasonable to conclude that in all likelihood 
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the decision to mobilize will be delayed considerably. The 
longer it takes for NATO to decide to mobilize in the face 
of a Pact invasion, the less likely it will be able to 
thwart the attack. Unless mobilization is initiated shortly 
after Pact mobilization is indicated, the defense of Central 
Europe will fail. 
The weaknesses of Forward Defense are significant, but 
it appears that the strengths outweigh them. If it is true 
that no other strategy is politically acceptable, then the 
critics of Forward Defense are wasting their time. This 
fact is particularly born out when one considers all of the 
factors that make the strategy the most likely to succeed 
militarily. That is not to say that improvements cannot be 
made. One of the most obvious, for example, would be to 
make better use of the current time of peace to construct 
more and better barriers and obstacles near the IGB. If 
political approval could be achieved, this suggestion should 
prove to be relatively inexpensive and extremely beneficial 
to the successful implementation of Forward Defense. The 
main obstacle to this suggestion is the German hope and 
belief that the two Germanies will eventually be reunited. 
Construction of barriers and/or obstacles is seen by the 
Germans as a permanent sign of acceptance of the two 
separate German countries. 
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Undoubtedly there are many more improvements to be 
realized. If the critics of Forward Defense were to turn 
their attention toward finding more ways to improve the 
implementation of the strategy rather than trying to find an 
alternative to it, over all deterrence would most assuredly 
be enhanced. That is the purpose of a viable and strong 
conventional defense in the first place--to be strong enough 
to deter an aggressor from even attempting a military 
attack. 
Understanding the complexities of an issue facilitates 
informed debate and a more thorough examination of the 
facts. It is hoped that th is study will make it easier for 
the reader to comprehend the complexities of the NATO 
alliance and especially the NATO conventional battlefield 
strategy. In addition to promoting a better understanding 
of NATO conventional defense, it is also hoped that this 
study will stimulate future research and thinking about this 
important and rapidly changing subject. 
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